This essay is a didactic introduction to the literature on the "consistency principle" and its "converse". An allocation rule is consistent if for each problem in its domain of definition and each alternative that it chooses for it, then for the "reduced problem" obtained by imagining the departure of an arbitrary subgroup of the agents with their "components of the alternative" and reassessing the options open to the remaining agents, it chooses the restriction of the alternative to that subgroup. Converse consistency pertains to the opposite operation. It allows us to deduce that a rule chooses an alternative for a problem from the knowledge that for each two-agent subgroup, it chooses its restriction to the subgroup for the associated reduced problem this subgroup faces.
Introduction
This essay is a didactic introduction to the literature on the "consistency principle" and its "converse". A "solution" associates with each decision problem in some domain one or several of its feasible alternatives, usually interpreted as recommendations for it. The principles pertain to the behavior of solutions whose domains of definition contain problems involving populations that may vary from one to the other, and for which it is therefore meaningful to compare the choices they make for different populations. (By contrast, most of the early axiomatic literature had been written for fixed populations.) Informally, the consistency principle states the following. Consider a problem and an alternative chosen by a solution for it. Then, imagine some agents "leaving with their components of the alternative", and examine the "reduced problem" that the remaining agents face, that is, reevaluate their opportunities at that point. The solution is consistent if for this problem, it chooses the restriction of the alternative to this subgroup. Thus, there is no need to reevaluate a chosen alternative as we start implementing it.
The principle of converse consistency pertains to the opposite operation. Consider a problem and an alternative in its feasible set. Suppose that for each two-agent subgroup of the agents this problem involves, a solution chooses the restriction of the alternative to the subgroup for the associated reduced problem this subgroup faces. The solution is conversely consistent if, under these conditions, it chooses the alternative for the initial problem. Thus, the desirability of an alternative can be deduced from the desirability, for each of its two-agent subgroups, of its restriction to the subgroup for the associated reduced problem the subgroup faces.
The principles, first investigated for abstract models of cooperative game theory, have now been examined in the context of a great variety of concrete problems of resource allocation, and for many models, their implications are quite well understood. We will survey some of these developments.
The essay is organized as follows. We first introduce the basic concepts of a "problem" and of a "solution", and our two principles. We also describe a number of variants of the principles. Then, we present two lemmas involving the principles that have been critical in understanding their implications in a wide range of situations. Finally, we sketch several characterizations based on the principles.
In order to illustrate various ideas and techniques, we specify a number of models in succession. Our objective however is not a comprehensive account of what is known of the principles for these models, but rather to show their usefulness in evaluating allocation rules, and in exposing some of the mechanics of proofs based on them. For a detailed survey of the vast literature devoted to their study, see Thomson (2011b) .
2 Basic concepts: domains and solutions
A problem is given by a set of alternatives and a set of agents whose preferences are defined over this set, or over "personal" components of it. A domain of problems satisfying some regularity conditions is specified, and the objective is to identify one or several feasible alternatives for each problem in the domain. Depending upon the context, such an alternative is interpreted as a recommendation that an arbitrator, (or a planner, a highlevel manager, a judge . . . ) could make, or as a prediction of what the agents could choose if left to their own devices. A solution is a correspondence defined on the domain that associates with each problem in the domain a non-empty subset of its feasible set. For several of the models that we use as examples, the most interesting solutions are single-valued, but we will proceed under the assumption that this property may not hold. Indeed, for a number of others, it is very demanding, and the central solutions are multi-valued.
A number of tests can be devised to evaluate how satisfactory a solution is. Consistency involves testing each alternative it chooses for each group of agents and each problem involving this group, to the choices it makes for the "reduced" problems associated with subgroups and this alternative.
We use the following notation and language. There is an infinite set of "potential" agents indexed by the natural numbers, N. To specify a problem, we first draw a finite number of them from this infinite population. Let N denote the family of nonempty finite subsets of N. For each N ∈ N , there is a class of problems D N that N could face. Solutions are defined over the union D ≡ ∪ N ∈N D N of these classes as N varies in N . When an alternative is chosen by a solution S for a problem D, we say that it is S-optimal for D. If a solutionS only chooses alternatives that are also chosen by some solution S, we say thatS is a subsolution of S. For simplicity, we introduce each domain of problems, D N , for a fixed population N ∈ N , but once again, solutions are understood to be defined over
To see the need for testing how solutions behave when the population of agents varies, we introduce our first domain, which pertains to fair division. Thomson, 2010a , for a survey of the literature on the subject) is a pair (R, Ω) where R ≡ (R i ) i∈N is a list of preference relations defined on the non-negative quadrant R ℓ + of the ℓ-dimensional commodity space for some ℓ ∈ N, and Ω ∈ R ℓ ++ is a social endowment. Preferences are continuous, monotone increasing, and convex. The asymmetric part of R i is denoted by P i and the associated indifference relation is denoted by I i . A feasible allocation for (R, Ω) is a list z ∈ R ℓN + such that
Domain 1 A classical problem of fair division (see
Several of the solutions defined for this model will also play a role in the analysis of models introduced later. We will not repeat the formal definitions then. 
Examples of solutions for

}.
3 Figure 1 illustrates the great freedom available in defining solutions in a variable population framework. Column a represents the solution that chooses the equal-division Walrasian allocations for each economy, and Column b the solution that chooses the envy-free allocations for each economy.
2 By R N and R N ℓ we mean the cross-product of |N | copies of R and R ℓ respectively, indexed by the members of N .
3 The notation ∆ ℓ designates the unit simplex in the ℓ-dimensional Euclidean space. When a solution is defined over a domain of problems involving arbitrary sets of agents, it can in principle choose allocations in completely different ways as population varies. Giving free rein to our imagination, let us consider for instance the solution that chooses the efficient allocations for each twoagent economy, the envy-free and efficient allocations for each three-agent economy, and the equal-division Walrasian allocations for each economy involving more agents (Column c). Columns d−e represent two other solutions, both of which also seem quite hard to justify. Note that in these examples as well as in several of the figures below, solutions are schematically shown as making recommendations in a manner that depends on the number of agents and not on their identify, but in general, a solution could take this data into consideration too. In any case, these examples make it clear that some tests are needed to relate the choices made by solutions for different sets of agents.
In the next two sections we introduce two such tests.
3 Consistency and its converse
In this section, we introduce the ideas of "consistency" "converse consistency", and illustrate them by means of several examples. We only give a few sample proofs that certain solutions pass or do not pass these tests. In most cases, these are simple exercises, which we suggest to the reader as a way of progressively strengthening his or her understanding of the subject, as well as gaining familiarity with the models, not all of which are standard, that we will discuss. The figures should be seen as an integral part of our exposition, as their detailed legends sometimes contain sketches of proofs.
Consistent allocation rules: the general definition
Very informally, we require of a solution that there should never be a need to revise an alternative it has chosen, once some agents "have received their components of it" and left. Here, the clause "have received their components of the alternative" is only meant to be suggestive, and we devote the next few pages to giving it substance.
To take a first step in this direction, let N ∈ N and D ∈ D N be a problem that N could face. Let S be a solution and x be one of the S-optimal alternatives for D. Now, let us imagine some agents leaving with their components of x, and let us reevaluate the situation at this point, namely let us identify the options that are still available to the remaining agents. If N ′ is the subgroup they constitute, we refer to the set of alternatives at which the agents who leave (the subgroup N \N ′ ) receive their components of x, as the reduced problem of D with respect to N ′ and x. We denote it by r x N ′ (D). What has to be clarified for each model is what should be understood by this reduced problem. It is not always obvious how to do so, but we can already give our central definition. Let S be a solution. 
Consistency: For each group
We have presented the consistency principle as a robustness requirement on a solution: the solution should make coherent choices as population changes. The principle also has a fairness interpretation. The central idea of solidarity is that when the circumstances in which some group of agents find themselves change, and if none of them bears any particular responsibility for the change, or deserves any particular credit for it, then their welfare should be affected in the same direction. One expression of the idea involves imagining that some agents leave empty-handed, and it gives us the requirement of population monotonicity (Thomson, 1983) . Another expression is obtained by imagining instead that the members of the group N \ N ′ leave with their components of x (as opposed to empty-handed). In many situations in which efficiency is imposed too, requiring that the welfare of all the members of N ′ should be affected in the same direction essentially leads to the invariance requirement expressed by consistency.
The following variants of consistency have been explored. (i) First is the property, which often turns out to be only slightly weaker, that is obtained by limiting attention to subgroups of two remaining agents, a variant called bilateral consistency.
(ii) Apart from size, it is sometimes natural to impose other restrictions on the subgroups. The class they constitute may be endowed with some particular structure that reflects certain aspects of social organization, such as communication networks, trade groups, family relations, and so on. (iii) A third variant is obtained, for single-valued solutions, and in models in which feasible sets are equipped with a convex structure, as follows: instead of asking that the restriction of x to each subgroup be chosen for the associated reduced problem that this subgroup faces, we require that for each agent, his component of x coincide with the average of what he would receive in the reduced problems associated with x and all of the proper subgroups of N to which he belongs (Maschler and Owen, 1989 ). This variant is called average consistency. A bilateral version of this variant can be defined in which the averages only involve reduced problems with two agents.
We will illustrate various choices that we have in defining reduced problems by considering several applications. z is an equal-division Walrasian allocation in the economy with agent set {1, 2, 3} depicted here; after agent 3 leaves with his bundle z 3 , the resources that remain available to agents 1 and 2 are z 1 + z 2 , and if each of them is endowed with z 1 +z 2 2 , equilibrium is indeed achieved by quoting the same prices: the pair (z 1 , z 2 ) is a Walrasian allocation of the economy (R 1 , R 2 , z 1 + z 2 ). (b) The equal-division lower bound and Pareto solution is not consistent: here, z meets the bound in the threeagent economy, but since
agents are the lists of bundles, one bundle for each of them, obtained by redividing the sum of the bundles that were intended for them in the first place.
4 Specifically, given e ≡ (R, Ω), N ′ ⊂ N , and z ∈ S(e), the reduced economy of e with respect to N ′ and z is the pair (
It is easy to see that the Pareto solution is consistent since, if no Paretoimproving reallocation of the social endowment can be achieved by the group N , then of course no Pareto-improving reallocation of the resources they have received can be achieved by any subgroup N ′ ⊂ N . The no-envy solution is consistent too: if an agent would not want to exchange bundles with anyone in the initial group N , then a fortiori, he would not want to exchange bundles with anyone in any subgroup N ′ ⊂ N . On the other hand, the equal-division lower bound solution is not consistent (Figure 2b ). It is tempting to say that this is because in a reduced economy, the point of equal division is typically not what it was in the initial economy. Thus, if initially, an agent finds his component of some allocation at least as desirable as equal division, there is no reason why this should still be true in a reduced economy associated with the allocation. But that is not the whole story because a solution such as the equal-division Walrasian solution, which obviously also depends on equal division, is consistent (Figure 2a) . The reason is that the points of equal division in the reduced economies associated with an equal-division Walrasian allocation z of some initial economy are related in a very special way, namely, they all have the same value at some prices supporting z. Thus, in each of these reduced economies, if these same prices are quoted, the budget sets the remaining agents face are the same as they were initially; this guarantees that for each such agent, the same bundle maximizes his preferences, and in turn, equality of demand and supply.
We consider next the problem of rationing. Such a problem can be modeled as an economy with single-peaked preferences, as follows: Domain 2 A fair division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991 
Examples of solutions for Domain 2
The Pareto solution, the noenvy solution, and the equal-division lower bound solution are defined as for classical problems of fair division. The uniform rule chooses the feasible allocation z of (R, Ω) such that for some (Figure 13a illustrates the definition).
Here too, when defining a reduction, we simply imagine some agents leaving with their assignments; the social endowment is whatever is left of the endowment. It is easy to see that the Pareto solution, the no-envy solution, and the uniform rule are consistent; the equal-division lower bound solution is not. 
The reduction operation for models formulated in utility space
For the model of bargaining presented next, feasible sets are given in utility space.
Domain 3
A bargaining problem is a compact, convex, and comprehensive 5 subset T of R N + , containing at least one strictly positive point.
Examples of solutions for Domain 3
The Nash solution,N , (Nash, 1950) chooses the point of T that maximizes the product of utilities. The egalitarian solution, E, (Kalai, 1977) chooses the maximal point of T of equal utilities. Now call the "ideal point of T " the point whose i-th coordinate is the maximal utility agent i can achieve in T . Then, the KalaiSmorodinsky solution, K, (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) chooses the maximal point of T proportional to its ideal point.
Here, agents are assigned utility levels, and when some of them leave, it is most natural to define the set of options open to the remaining agents as the subset of the initial problem consisting of all the vectors at which the departing agents receive their promised payoffs. Given a problem T involving some group N , the reduced problem of T with respect to N ′ ⊂ N and x is therefore {x
Geometrically, this is the section of T by the plane parallel to the N ′ -coordinate subspace through x, seen as a subset of R N ′ . The Nash solution is consistent but the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is not (Figure 3 ). The egalitarian solution is consistent on the subdomain of problems on which it chooses Pareto-optimal outcomes (in general, this solution only selects "weakly" Pareto optimal points) 6 . To understand the difference between the definition considered here and the definition we gave above for classical problems of fair division, note that when a feasible set is defined as the image in utility space of a set of allocations obtained by distributing a social endowment, if the departing agents leave with physical amounts of goods giving them their agreed-upon utilities, the set of options available to the remaining agents is typically a subset of the feasible set of the reduced game as we just defined it for bargaining problems (except in the one-good case).
The reduction operation when the departing agents remain "available"
In some models, the phrase "an agent leaves with his payoff" should only be understood to mean that his payoff has been decided. Provided that he does get it in the end, the agents who stay may still be able to "cooperate" with him. This is illustrated by the next model.
Domain 4 A (transferable utility) coalitional game is a vector v ∈ R 2 |N |−1 , with coordinates indexed by the nonempty subgroups of N , called coalitions, each coordinate of v being interpreted as what the corresponding coalition can achieve; it is the worth of the coalition.
Examples of solutions for Domain 4
The core (Gillies, 1959) 
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) chooses the payoff vector whose i-th coordinate is equal to
then, the prenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) Here, in the definition of a reduced game, different scenarios can be imagined in which the commitment to give some agents the payoffs assigned to them by a solution is honored. Each results in a particular specification of the set of options available to the remaining agents. Given a coalition C ⊂ N ′ , a first possibility is to calculate, as for bargaining problems, what C can achieve by getting together with the departing agents-cooperating with them produces the worth v(C ∪ N \N ′ )-and giving them their agreed-upon
it is its worth in the reduced game. For the grand coalition N ′ , we propose the
Since the complement of N ′ is involved in the reduced game, we name the resulting condition complement consistency (Moulin, 1988) .
Alternatively, we can let C choose which ones of the departing agents to cooperate with. By getting together with C ′ ⊆ N \N ′ , the worth v(C ∪ C ′ ) is generated, but since the members of C ′ have to be paid
Then, the worth of C in the reduced game is defined to be the maximal such difference when C ′ ranges over the subsets of N \N ′ . For the grand coalition, we choose the same formula as for complement consistency. As this definition is based on a maximization exercise, we name it max-consistency (Davis and Maschler, 1965) .
The core satisfies both definitions and the Shapley value satisfies neither. The prenucleolus only satisfies the second one. (a) We start from an economy with agent set {1, 2, 3} in which each of the three agents has preferences defined over the product of R with the set consisting of the three objects available, {a, b, c}. The chosen allocation is z. (b) Agent 3 leaves with his bundle z 3 , which contains object c. In the reduced economy associated with the group {1, 2} and z, the preferences of agents 1 and 2 are restricted to the product of R with the set consisting of the remaining objects, {a, b}.
When the reduction operation suggests a reduction of consumption spaces
In any model formulated in commodity space, it is possible and sometimes natural to require that solutions only depend on the restrictions of preferences to the set of bundles that are actually feasible. 8 When some agents leave with certain resources, the set of bundles achievable by any one of the remaining agents gets smaller, which then calls for redefining their preferences. For some models, consumption spaces are "decomposable" in a way that makes requiring this kind of independence even more tempting. Then, we say that we "reduce" consumption spaces and preference relations. An illustration is provided by the next domain.
Domain 5
An allocation problem with indivisible goods and one infinitely divisible good (Svensson, 1983) 
is a list (M, A, R) where M ∈ R is some amount of an infinitely divisible good (often called "money"), A is a finite set of "objects" drawn from some infinite list A, and R ≡ (R i ) i∈N is a list of preference relations defined over the product R × A. Preferences are continuous and strictly monotonic with respect to the divisible good. We assume |N | = |A|. A feasible allocation is a pair (m, σ) where m ∈ R
N is a list of amounts of the divisible good satisfying
and σ is a bijection from N to A indicating which object each agent receives.
This model is illustrated in Figure 4a for a three-agent example. With each object is associated an axis along which the amount of the divisible good that will go with it is measured, thereby defining a bundle assigned to one agent. We impose no sign constraint on the consumption of the divisible good. The broken lines connect bundles that are indifferent to each other for a particular agent.
Examples of solutions for Domain 5
The Pareto, no-envy, and egalitarian-equivalence solutions are all still meaningful here, and there is no need to restate the definitions.
9
It is important to understand that whether or not we reduce consumption spaces affects which solutions are consistent. For instance, if we do, the egalitarian-equivalence solution violates the property; indeed, an agent could leave with the object appearing in the reference bundle associated with some egalitarian-equivalent allocation taken as point of departure. But if we do not, the solution is consistent, just as it is for classical problems of fair division (Domain 1). For the no-envy solution however, it does not matter which specification is adopted; it is consistent either way.
Another model for which it is natural to reduce consumption spaces pertains is the following: Domain 6 A matching problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962) is defined by first partitioning the set of agents N , assumed to contain an even number of agents, into two groups of equal sizes, denoted by M and W , and called "men" and "women"; then, specifying a list R of strict preference relations for them; for each i ∈ M , R i is defined over W , and for each i ∈ W , R i is defined over M . A feasible allocation is a bijection, or "match", from the set of men to the set of women.
Examples of solutions for Domain 6 The Pareto solution is defined in the usual way. The stable solution chooses for each matching problem the set of matches such that there is no pair of a man and a woman who prefer each other to their assigned mates. (There always are such matches.)
The man-optimal solution chooses the stable match that is best for each man in the set of all stable matches. (There always is such a match.) The woman-optimal solution is defined in a symmetric way.
Given a match chosen by a solution for a particular matching problem, we imagine agents leaving in matched pairs, and in a reduced economy, we define the preferences of each remaining agent to be the restriction of his or her preferences over his or her remaining possible partners. It is easy to see that as usual, the Pareto solution is consistent. So is the stable solution. The man-optimal solution is not however, and of course neither is the womanoptimal solution.
Closedness of domains under the reduction operation
According to our definition of consistency, nothing is required of a solution if the reduced problem does not belong to its domain of definition. A stronger definition is obtained by adding the requirement that the reduced problem be in the domain.
How restrictive this additional requirement is depends on the situation. There are domains such that, for each feasible outcome, the natural way to define the reduction produces a problem that is automatically included. We then say that the domain is closed under the reduction operation. An example here are classical problems of fair division (Domain 1): if (R, Ω) is admissible and z is a feasible allocation for it, then (R N ′ , ∑ N ′ z i ) is admissible too. On the other hand, suppose that instead of thinking of the departing agents leaving with their components of z, we had imagined them leaving with the commitment that whatever allocation is eventually chosen should give them the welfare levels they experience at z. Then, the reduced problem of (R, Ω) with respect to N ′ and z would consists of all the lists (z
. Such a reduced economy could not be described as a pair (
For another example, consider economies with production. There, what first comes to mind in defining the production set of a reduced economy is to translate that of the initial economy by the vector of goods taken with them by the departing agents. But it is unlikely that this resulting set will satisfy the same regularity conditions, such as "no free lunch", "increasing returns to scale", . . . , that may have been imposed on the initial production set.
In other cases, the reduced problem is admissible only if the outcome is chosen in a certain way. If this happens for the outcomes chosen by a particular solution, we say that the domain is closed under the reduction operation for the solution. This is illustrated by our next domain. (O'Neill, 1982; Thomson, 2003 Here, the most natural way of defining the reduced problem of (c, E) with respect to N ′ ⊂ N and an awards vector
Domain 7 A claims problem
It is easy to see that the proportional solution is consistent, and that so are the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses solutions. On the other hand, simple examples can be constructed that reveal that the random arrival solution is not. Now, note that in general, in a reduced problem associated with an arbitrary feasible allocation for (c, E), we may not have
However it makes sense to require of a solution S that if x = S(c, E), then for each i ∈ N , x i ≤ c i . If this property of claims boundedness is satisfied,
Thus, we can say that the domain of claims problems is closed under the reduction operation for any solution satisfying claims boundedness.
A surplus sharing problem (Moulin, 1987 ) is defined like a claims problem except that the inequality ∑ c i ≤ E is imposed instead. The number c i is interpreted as the investment made by agent i ∈ N in a successful venture whose worth is E. A feasible allocation for (c, E) is a vector
For a solution that chooses vectors x satisfying the natural requirement that for each i ∈ N , x i ≥ c i , closedness of the domain under the reduction operation holds.
Finally, consider the domain consisting of all claims problems and all surplus-sharing problems; for a problem in this enlarged domain, no relation is imposed between ∑ c i and E. Starting from a surplus-sharing problem, and given a feasible allocation for it, an associated reduced problem may be a claims problem, and conversely. But all of these problems being admissible, the solution is applicable in each case.
Constructing consistent solutions
Here, we identify several operations preserving consistency. These operations will permit us to construct new consistent solutions using as building blocks solutions known to have the property.
We start with an informal observation that should provide some intuition for some of the assertions made in the remainder of this subsection: suppose that a solution is progressively "more and more restrictive" for groups of agents of increasing sizes. Then, starting from an alternative that it chooses for some problem, it has a better chance of choosing the restrictions of the alternative for the reduced problems associated with it. Still speaking informally, a consistent solution is more and more "tapered" for problems involving more and more agents (Figure 5a ).
Constructing new consistent solutions by intersecting existing ones
Consistency is preserved under intersections: given two consistent solutions, if their intersection (the "inner envelope" of Figure 5b ) is well-defined, that is, if it is non-empty for each admissible problem, then it is consistent. To illustrate, for classical problems of fair division (Domain 1), both the Pareto
Figure 5: The "shape" of consistent solutions. For each of these three panels, the range of possible alternatives is schematically indicated horizontally, and for each population, the subset of alternatives chosen by a solution is shown as a horizontal segment. The union of these segment as population varies is the "profile" of the solution. It is the shaded area of panel (a). This panel shows that a consistent solution is more and more restrictive for groups of agents with larger and larger populations. This results in a "tapered" shape. Starting from some alternative a chosen for some problem with n agents, we symbolize consistency of the solution by indicating that the restriction of the alternative to a subgroup of agents, say to a subgroup of four agents-this restriction is symbolized by the vertical downward arrow to b-is an alternative that is chosen by the solution at that level for the associated reduced problem. We also show how some other alternative c chosen for a four-agent problem when the reduction is to a two-agent problem, is an alternative (denoted d in the figure) that would be chosen for it. (b) If two solutions S 1 and S 2 are consistent, then so is their intersection, if well defined: the "inner envelope" of the two tapered solutions, which represents this intersection, is also tapered. (c) If two solutions S 1 and S 2 are consistent, so is their union: the outer "envelope" of the two solutions is tapered.
solution and the no-envy solution are consistent. Thus, their intersection, which under standard assumptions on preferences is well-defined, is consistent too.
In fact, consistency is preserved under arbitrary intersections, and this permits us to define a consistent inner envelope to a solution that may not be consistent, as follows. Let S be a solution. In most situations of interest, the solution that associates with each problem its whole feasible set is consistent. Therefore, the family of consistent solutions containing S is non-empty. Let S denote the intersection of all of its members. Since they all contain S, so doesS. As we just argued,S is also consistent. Obviously then, it is the smallest consistent solution to contain S (Figure 6a) . Formally, the minimal consistent enlargement 11 of a solution S is defined as
Constructing new consistent solutions by taking the union of existing ones
Similarly, consistency is preserved under arbitrary unions (the outer envelope of Figure 5c ), so that if a solution is not consistent but has at least one consistent subsolution, it has a maximal subsolution that is consistent, simply the union of all of its consistent subsolutions. Formally, the maximal consistent subsolution of a solution S that contains at least one consistent solution is defined as
Constructing new consistent solutions from consistent solutions ordered by inclusion
Let (S ℓ ) ℓ∈{1,...,k} be a list of consistent solutions ordered by inclusion, S 1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ S k , and (n ℓ ) ℓ∈{1,···,k−1} a list of natural numbers such that n 1 < · · · < n k−1 . Now, consider the solution that coincides with S 1 for each problem involving no more than n 1 agents, with S 2 for each problem involving between n 1 + 1 and n 2 agents, . . . , and with S k for each problem involving more than 
Conversely consistent solutions
Our second central property of a solution permits us to deduce that it chooses an alternative x for some problem involving some group of agents if it chooses the restriction of x to each two-agent subgroup for the reduced problem associated with the subgroup and x. Consider the economy (R, Ω) with agent set {1, 2, 3}, and the allocation z. Note that for each two-agent group {i, j}, the restriction of z to the subgroup is an equal-division Walrasian for the reduced economy (R i , R j , z i + z j ), but z is not an equal-division Walrasian allocation for (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , Ω). (Under smoothness of preferences, the property holds however.) (b) The equal-division lower bound solution is not conversely consistent either. Again, we consider an economy (R, Ω) with agent set N ≡ {1, 2, 3}. For each {i, j} ∈ N , we have (
For the problem of allocating indivisible goods and one infinitely divisible good, the Pareto solution is not conversely consistent. Indeed, let (M, A, R) with agent set N ≡ {1, 2, 3} be such that M = 6, A ≡ {a, b, c}, and that preferences R are such that (2, a) I 1 (4, b) I 1 (1, c), and that the following statements, obtained by "rotation", hold for agents 2 and 3 : (2, b) I 2 (4, c) I 2 (1, a) and (2, c) I 3 (4, a) I 3 (1, b). It is easy to see that no Pareto improving trade can take place in any of the three two-agent reduced economies associated with the allocation z represented here, which is feasible. However, the allocation (z 2 , z 3 , z 1 ) Pareto-dominates z in the three-agent economy.
This property does not appear as normatively compelling as consistency but it is of great computational interest, as it permits us to determine whether an alternative would be chosen for a problem possibly involving a large number of agents from the knowledge that its restrictions to subgroups of two agents, for which calculations are generally less complicated, are chosen for the associated reduced problems. Of course, if there are many agents initially, there are many reduced problems for which this simpler calculation has to be carried out.
12 Also, converse consistency does not help us discover S-optimal alternatives, but simply check whether a proposed alternative is S-optimal. Yet, the property suggests algorithms that sometimes converge to an S-optimal alternative. Starting from some alternative for some problem, visit pairs of agents in succession, and for each pair, adjust the alternative by replacing the components pertaining to the members of the pair by one of the two-agent alternatives that the solution would recommend for the reduced problem associated with the pair and the revised overall alternative of the previous stage. The possibility of convergence is explored by Thomson (2010b) who gives examples of models for which it occurs and others for which it does not.
A different formulation consists in writing the hypothesis for each reduced problem of cardinality up to |N | − 1, but it turns out that for many models, this amounts to the same thing.
For some models, the hypothesis for the two-agent case is actually no restriction on the solution. The property should then be rewritten with the hypothesis stated for the smallest number of agents for which it does constitute a meaningful restriction. An example of such a model is matching (Domain 6).
Converse consistency too is preserved under intersections and unions. Thus, the minimal conversely consistent enlargement and the maximal conversely consistent subsolution of a given solution can be defined analogously to the way we defined the notions of minimal consistent enlargement and maximal consistent subsolution. An example is calculated byÖzkal-Sanver (2009) for matching (Domain 6).
Here are a few examples of conversely consistent solutions: for bargaining (Domain 3) the Nash solution is not in general conversely consistent, but it is on the subdomain of problems whose boundary is smooth; the egalitarian solution enjoys this property even if this assumption is not made.
For classical problems of fair division (Domain 1), the Pareto solution and the equal-division Walrasian solution are conversely consistent on the subdomain of economies with smooth preferences (Figure 7a shows how the latter would violate the property without the smoothness assumption). The equal-division lower bound solution is not, and neither is its intersection with the Pareto solution (Figure 7b) . Here, no natural restriction on preferences exists under which the property can be recovered. In any context where permutations of bundles across agents are meaningful, such as for various problems of fair allocation of privately appropriable goods, including classical problems of fair division (Domain 1), fair division problems with single-peaked preferences (Domain 2), or economies with indivisible goods and some infinitely divisible good (Domain 5), the no-envy solution is conversely consistent, precisely because it is based on two-agent tests. Whenever the notion of proportionality is well-defined, such as for fair division problems with single-peaked preferences (Domain 2), or for taxation (Domain 7), the proportional solution is conversely consistent. For the allocation of indivisible goods and some infinitely divisible good (Domain 5), the Pareto solution is not conversely consistent (Figure 7c ).
Logical relations between consistency and its converse
Consistency and its converse are not logically related in general. Indeed, for bargaining (Domain 3) we already noted the following facts: the Nash solution is consistent (Figure 3a) but not conversely consistent, and the reverse holds for the egalitarian solution. Both are single-valued, so these solutions can serve to answer, in the negative, a question that is often raised, namely whether this property helps relate consistency and its converse. However, for some models, interesting logical relations do hold, or hold under minor additional conditions (Domain 7) (Chun, 1999) .
A property that bears an interesting conceptual relation to consistency and its converse is flexibility: starting from an S-optimal allocation for some economy, suppose that a subgroup redistributes between its members what they have jointly received. Then, provided it performs these redistributions according to S, the conjunction of the list of resulting bundles for its members together with the bundles initially assigned to the complementary group, defines an allocation for the initial economy that is also S-optimal (Balinski and Young, 1982) .
It is easy to see that a single-valued solution is consistent if and only if it is flexible.
Lifting properties across cardinalities by means of consistency
It is often the case that if a certain property is imposed on a bilaterally consistent solution for the two-agent case, then the property is transferred, we say lifted, to the other cardinalities. For instance, consider the requirement of equal treatment of equals, which says that two agents with the same characteristics should be treated in the same way; for resource allocation problems, this means that they should receive bundles that are indifferent to each other according to their common preferences.
13 Let S be a consistent solution. Let e be an economy in which two agents i and j ∈ N have the same characteristics. Then, we claim that at an allocation x that is S-optimal for e, the two agents should receive indifferent bundles. Indeed, by consistency of S, in the reduced economy of e with respect to {i, j} and x, the two agents still receive their components of x; since they have the same characteristics and S satisfies equal treatment of equals in the two-agent case, these components of x are indifferent bundles for them.
Other properties are lifted by consistency. As a result, theorems involving consistency can often be stated with these properties being only required for the two-agent case. Lifting results for claims problems (Domain 7), are established in Hokari and Thomson (2008) . Examples of properties that are lifted are certain continuity and invariance properties. However, lifting does not occur as generally as one might expect, as illustrated there. Occasionally, properties are lifted provided a solution satisfies some other basic properties. Still in the context of claims problems, a property that is particularly helpful in that regard is endowment monotonicity, the requirement that, if the endowment increases, each claimant should receive at least as much as he received initially (again, see Hokari and Thomson) .
Similarly, one can define the lifting of an order defined on a space of solutions. An order is lifted by consistency if given two solutions that are related in that order in the two-agent case, if both are consistent, then they are related in the same way for any number of agents. Here too, lifting can be assisted by certain properties of the solutions. An application to the Lorenz order on the space of solutions to claims problems (Domain 7) is proposed and studied by Thomson (2011a) . Indeed, the Lorenz order can be used to compare the awards vectors of a problem, but it can also be used to compare solutions: a rule Lorenz dominates another one if for each problem, the awards vector it chooses Lorenz dominates the awards vector the other one chooses. If two solutions are consistent, endowment monotonic, order awards as claims are (given two claimants, both always assign at least as much to the larger claimant as they do to the smaller claimant), and one Lorenz dominates the other in the two-agent case, this domination extends to all cardinalities. Thus, the Lorenz order is lifted with the assistance of these two basic properties.
The Elevator Lemma
Consistency and its converse are versatile principles and they have been studied in models exhibiting great diversity in their mathematical structures. An unfortunate consequence of this diversity is that few theorems are available that apply across all, or most models. However, we can offer two extremely useful lemmas that are "model-free". We illustrate them in several contexts. In Section 6, where we present a number of characterizations, we will see that much of the work in proving them often consists in showing that the Lemmas are applicable.
Statement of the Elevator Lemma
The first lemma identifies conditions on two solutions guaranteeing that if an inclusion relation holds between them for two agents, then this relation holds for any number of agents: if S ⊆S for the two-agent case, S is consistent, and S is conversely consistent, then S ⊆S for each cardinality. Given a problem involving an arbitrary number of agents, and an alternative that is S-optimal for it, its proof consists in applying the consistency of S to deduce the Soptimality of its restrictions to each of the two-agent associated reduced problems, invoking the inclusion relation that holds in the two-agent case to derive a parallel list of statements forS, and deriving theS-optimality of the alternative by means of the converse consistency ofS. Using the image of a building whose floors are indexed by the cardinalities of problems (Figure 8) , we refer to this lemma as the "Elevator Lemma": consistency is the "Down" button and converse consistency the "Up" button. Figure 8 shows no first floor because for most models, nothing is learned from how a solution behaves on the class of one-agent problems. Therefore, no generality is lost in excluding these problems from the domain.
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Lemma 1 (The "Elevator Lemma") Let S andS be two solutions defined on a domain D that is closed under the reduction operation for S. If (i) on the subdomain of two-agent problems, S is a subsolution ofS, (ii) S is consistent, and (iii)S is conversely consistent, then S is a subsolution ofS on the entire domain D.
Proof: Let N ∈ N , D ∈ D N , and x be S-optimal for D. We need to show that x isS-optimal for D. Since S is consistent, then for each subgroup N ′ of N , the restriction x N ′ of x to N ′ is S-optimal for the associated reduced problem r Note that bilateral consistency would suffice in the Elevator Lemma. We stated earlier that converse consistency may not be as compelling as consistency, but as we have seen, many solutions do satisfy the former property and the Elevator Lemma shows how this fact can be profitably exploited. 
Applications of the Elevator Lemma
The importance of the Elevator Lemma stems from the fact that there are many models for which an inclusion relation, or even coincidence, holds between certain solutions in the two-agent case that do not hold for more agents. We give three examples:
1. For classical problems of fair division (Domain 1) or fair division problems with single-peaked preferences (Domain 2), in the two-agent case, any allocation that meets the equal-division lower bound is envy-free.
2. For coalitional games (Domain 4), requiring that a solution be a subsolution of the core is very mild in the two-agent case; it simply means that the chosen payoff vectors are "imputations", namely that they meet the individual rationality conditions and are efficient. (There are no coalitions of intermediate size then.) 3. For claims problems (Domain 7), a number of different ways of thinking about the problem give us concede-and-divide in the two-claimant case.
The Bracing Lemma
We now turn to the second lemma, which identifies conditions on two solutions only assumed to be related by inclusion, guaranteeing that in fact they coincide.
Statement of the Bracing Lemma
Let S be a consistent solution and suppose that it is a subsolution of some solutionS. Given a problem D and an alternative x that isS-optimal for D, there will in general be some freedom to move away from x without leaving theS-optimal set. However, suppose that additional agents can be introduced and D augmented so as to include the additional agents in such a way that (i) only one alternative isS-optimal for the augmented problem, (ii) the restriction of that alternative to the initial group is precisely x -we will say that this alternative is an augmentation of x-, and (iii) the reduction of the augmented problem with respect to the initial group of agents and that augmented alternative is D. Now, since S ⊆S and (i) holds, the augmented alternative is the only S-optimal alternative for the augmented problem. Then, since S is consistent, and since (ii) and (iii) hold, we conclude that x is S-optimal for D. If this can be done for each N ∈ N , each D ∈ D N and each x ∈S(D), we conclude that S =S. We will illustrate the Bracing Lemma with another building metaphor. Consider the "house" of Figure 9a , constructed by nailing boards together. This structure will not be very stable because the nails will serve as axes of rotation for the boards. Two of their infinitely many possible configurations are indicated. However, it is possible to eliminate the unwanted degrees of freedom by adding "braces", as shown in Figure 9b . In the example, we have several choices of where to place braces but note that two of them are needed. If the structure to be stabilized were more complex, we could need more. These braces are the additional agents of the lemma.
Lemma 2 (The "Bracing Lemma") Let S be a consistent subsolution of some solutionS. Suppose thatS is such that for each
The proof follows directly from the definitions and in fact we have essentially given it in the paragraph preceding the lemma. Perhaps, it is not so much a bracing "lemma" as a bracing "construction".
Sometimes bracing requires only one additional agent-we will see an illustration in the context of allocation of indivisible goods and an infinitely divisible good (Domain 5)-, sometimes two are required, as for the allocation To stabilize it, we add two boards connecting two pairs of corners. Note that if only one of the two boards were added, the structure would not be completely stabilized. In fact, one board would not be sufficient no matter where it would be placed. On the other hand, there are other ways to position two new boards so as to obtain a stable structure. Also, a third board would be redundant.
of identical indivisible goods and an infinitely divisible good (a special case of Domain 5), and sometimes almost as many agents as are present initially are needed; an example here can be found in the context of fair division problems with single-peaked preferences (Domain 2). In some situations, instead of working with an infinite set of potential agents, it is natural to impose an upper bound on the size of the set; then, the Bracing Lemma only applies to a restricted class of situations.
Applications and variants of the Bracing Lemma
In applications, the question is when the "augmentation to uniqueness" of the Bracing Lemma is possible, and this depends on the richness of the domain of problems over which the solution is defined. To return to our architectural metaphor, bracing is possible there only if we have available a board that is long enough to be nailed diagonally. Of course, it will also depend on the solution under consideration.
When bracing is not possible
The following example will make it obvious that an augmentation to uniqueness is not always possible. For classical problems of fair division with strictly monotonic and strictly convex preferences, consider the Pareto solution. Starting from some economy and an arbitrary Pareto-optimal allocation for it, there is in general no way to introduce additional agents and additional resources-these resources being intended to provide bundles for them, thereby defining an augmented allocation, the allocation obtained by concatenating the allocation that is the point of departure with the list of bundles created for the new agents-so that in the augmented economy, this augmented allocation is the only one to be Pareto-optimal.
16 If this augmentation were possible, then by the Bracing Lemma, there would be no consistent subsolution of the Pareto solution, but we know this not to be true: the equal-division Walrasian solution is one (of course, we have other information about the structure of the set of Pareto-optimal allocations that confirms this).
Here is an example, in the same context of classical problems of fair division, for which the answer is a little less clear. It involves the no-envy solution (Figure 10 ). Let us say that the "envy constraints are met at an allocation for an agent" if he finds his bundle at least as desirable as each of the bundles assigned to the other agents. If the envy constraints are all met strictly for each agent, then reallocations will be possible within the envy-free set in each direction (Figure 10a ) (except when the boundary of the consumption spaces would get in the way). If some of them are met as indifferences, such reallocations may still be feasible but we will have to be more careful (Figure 10b) , and it may be that if sufficiently many of the noenvy constraints are met as indifferences, there will be no freedom to move at all. Figure 10c illustrates then a natural way to go about augmenting a two-agent economy with agent set {1, 2} in an attempt to obtain a unique envy-free allocation in the augmented economy that results. Starting from an envy-free allocation z ≡ (z 1 , z 2 ), introduce agent 3, and let z 3 designate a bundle of additional resources. These resources are intended for him, which is the reason for designating them as z 3 . As we just noted, the augmented allocation (z, z 3 ) will have a chance to be the only envy-free allocation in the augmented economy only if sufficiently many of the envy constraints are met as indifferences. Since we can choose z 3 as well as agent 3's preferences, we should probably make these choices in such a way that he is indifferent between z 3 and as many as possible of the bundles received by the agents initially present, and this is what we have done in the figure. If that does not work, the option of introducing more than one agent gives us the opportunity of increasing the proportion of the envy constraints that are met as indifferences, thereby getting us closer to our objective of creating a structure in which all degrees of freedom are eliminated.
However, once again, this construction will not work because the equaldivision Walrasian solution is a consistent subsolution of the no-envy solution too. Nevertheless, we proceeded in essentially the right way to brace an allocation, and our approach will be successful for other models: for the allocation of indivisible goods and an infinitely divisible good for example (Domain 5), it does allow bracing, as explained in Subsubsection 5.2.4 (Figures 11 and 12 ).
A model in which the Bracing Lemma is directly applicable
An important model illustrating the usefulness of the Bracing Lemma is the domain of coalitional games, but we will not go into details as it is a more difficult domain with which to work.
Bracing requiring an augmentation of the consumption spaces
We saw earlier that for some models, the reduction operation is most naturally accompanied by a reduction of consumption spaces and a restriction to the reduced spaces of the preferences of the agents who stay. This means that conversely, an augmentation of a problem will have to involve an augmentation of the consumption spaces of the agents initially present and an extension of their preferences to the augmented spaces. Examples of domains illustrating this operation are the allocation of indivisible goods and an infinitely divisible good (Domain 5) and matching (Domain 6).
Bracing "up to neutral exchanges" or "up to indifferent exchanges"
For a number of economic domains and for certain solutionsS of interest, theS-optimal set is often not a singleton but the allocations it contains are Pareto-indifferent. A useful variant of the Bracing Lemma in such situations (a) An economy with agent set {1, 2} and an envy-free allocation z for it at which the no-envy constraints are met strictly: by redistributing the divisible good (to z ′ for example), we do not violate the no-envy constraints. (b) This freedom to move in the envy-free set is eliminated up to a neutral exchange by adding one object (object c in the figure) and some arbitrary amount of the divisible good (given by the abscissa of z 3 ), introducing a new agent (agent 3) and specifying his preferences so that he is indifferent between the bundle of additional resources (z 3 )-this bundle is intended for him-and the components z 1 and z 2 of z; finally, extending the preferences of agents 1 and 2 so that each of them is indifferent between his old bundle and z 3 .
involves the requirement that the solution S should also satisfy Paretoindifference: if x and x ′ are feasible alternatives of D such that x is Soptimal for D and x ′ is Pareto-indifferent to x, then x ′ should also be Soptimal for D. This requirement, which seems innocuous enough, is not always met however.
17 Nevertheless, if imposed on S and if satisfied byS, the conclusion S =S of the Bracing Lemma is obtained by a slight modification of the proof given above.
For the allocation of indivisible goods and an infinitely divisible good (Domain 5), each envy-free allocation can be braced but only up to a "neutral exchange": the allocation z ′ is related to the allocation z by such an exchange if its components are obtained by reshuffling the components of z but each agent is indifferent between his old and new bundles (in Figure 11b , (z 1 , z 3 , z 2 ) is obtained from (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) by a neutral exchange). 
When bracing is possible only for distinguished alternatives
In some cases, not allS-optimal alternatives can be braced but only distinguished ones. If these distinguished alternatives exist for each problem, they provide the basis for defining a solution-let us call it S * -and our conclusion will be a containment of S * , as formally stated in the following lemma: Figure 12 : Lemma 3 applied to the allocation of a prize. (a) We start with an economy with agent set {1, 2, 3}. At z, agent 1 is the winner of the prize. By no-envy, agents 2 and 3's bundles are the same (they consist of the same amount of the divisible good and the null object), and their indifference curves through this common bundle pass to the right of z 1 ; also, agent 1's indifference curve through z 1 passes to the right of z 2 . The allocation z ′ is another envy-free allocation, obtained from z by transferring the divisible good from the losers to the winner. The allocation z cannot be braced. (b) The allocation at which the winner is indifferent between his bundle and the common bundle of the losers can be braced. By introducing a new agent, agent 4, and specifying his preferences so that he is indifferent between z 1 and z 2 , adding m 4 ≡ m 2 units of the divisible good, and giving him the bundle z 4 ≡ (m 4 , ν), we obtain an augmented allocation (z, z 4 ) that in the augmented economy, is the only envy-free allocation up to a neutral exchange (between agents 1 and 4). An illustration of Lemma 3 is provided by the allocation of a single indivisible good (a prize, say) and an infinitely divisible good, the equality between the numbers of objects and agents being reestablished by introducing "null objects". Getting a null object simply means not getting the prize (Figure 12 ). (Tadenuma and Thomson, 1993) chooses the envy-free allocation(s) at which the winner, the agent who is assigned the real object, is indifferent between his bundle and the common bundle of the losers.
Lemma 3 (Variant of the Bracing Lemma
Domain 8 A problem of allocating a single indivisible good and an infinitely divisible good is the simple version of Domain 5 when there is only one real object. The domain also includes economies where only some of the divisible good is to be allocated.
Examples of solutions for Domain 8 The winner's curse solution
See the legend of Figure 12 for an explanation of how Lemma 3 applies. There, we use the notation ν for the null object.
When bracing is achieved approximately
In some situations, bracing is achievable only approximately but with a "tolerance" that can be chosen arbitrarily small. Then, another useful variant of the Bracing Lemma is obtained by imposing some form of continuity on the solution. This possibility is illustrated by fair division problems with single-peaked preferences (Domain 2).
We refer to Figure 13 for a sketch of the analysis of this domain. It pertains to a solution assumed to be a consistent subsolution of the no-envy and Pareto solution. It shows that for each economy, allocations that are arbitrarily close to its uniform allocation has to be chosen. It represents a two-agent economy for which ∑ p(R i ) ≥ Ω, and whose uniform allocation is denoted by z (there, λ = z 2 ). The proof uses the obvious fact that at an efficient allocation, if ∑ p(R i ) ≥ Ω, then each agent receives at most his satiation amount, and if ∑ p(R i ) ≤ Ω, each agent receives at least his satiation amount.
Characterizations: a sampler
In this section, we state a few results involving consistency and its converse. They constitute but a small fraction of the literature, but we have selected them so as to give a flavor of the range of existing applications of the principles and whet the reader's appetite. Several of them use one or the other of the two Lemmas and variants. In some cases, very little work is required beyond showing that the hypotheses of the Lemmas are met.
Bargaining
Our first result, which pertains to bargaining (Domain 3), involves two basic properties. One is Pareto-optimality, whose definition we will not repeat. The other is anonymity, which says that the solution should be invariant under renamings of agents. We also impose scale invariance, according to which a linear rescaling, independent agent by agent, of their utilities, should be accompanied by a similar rescaling of the outcome. 
. We double the social endowment. We consider a solution that is a selection from the no-envy and Pareto solution. Let y ν be an allocation that it chooses for the augmented economy (R 1 , R 2 , R ν 3 , R ν 4 , 2Ω). By efficiency, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, y ν i ≤ p(R i ). Then by no-envy, y ν 1 = y ν 3 and y ν 2 = y ν 4 . This implies that at least one of agents 2 and 4 consumes more than p(R ν 3 ), and for agent 3 not to envy him, he should consume at least p( 
Figure 14: Characterization of the Nash solution (Theorem 1). (a) We start with a problem U with agent set {1, 2}. By scale invariance, we can assume that its Nash outcome has equal coordinates, (a, a). (b) We introduce a third agent, agent 3, and construct a three-agent problem as follows. First, we translate U along the third axis by the amount a. Let U ′ denote the result (shaded area). Next, we replicate U ′ twice by having the roles played by agents 1 and 2 in U ′ be played by agents 2 and 3 respectively, and then by agents 3 and 1 respectively. Finally, we construct the smallest convex and comprehensive problem, T , containing U ′ and its two replicas. Now, by Pareto-optimality and anonymity, the point chosen for T is (a, a, a) . The reduced problem of T with respect to {1, 2} and (a, a, a) happens to be U ′ . By consistency, the solution outcome of U ′ is (a, a). Since U = U ′ , we are done.
Theorem 1 (Lensberg, 1988) The Nash solution is the only solution satisfying single-valuedness, Pareto-optimality, anonymity, scale invariance, and consistency.
The proof, illustrated in Figure 14 , and sketched in its caption, involves an operation that can be described as an "augmentation to anonymity". Starting from an arbitrary problem S that may not have any particular symmetry, we augment it so as to obtain a problem T that has enough symmetries so that we can deduce by Pareto-optimality and anonymity the point that that it should choose; moreover, the reduced problem of T with respect to the initial group of agents and that point is S.
The construction works for any S whose boundary contains a segment centered at its Nash outcome that "extends sufficiently" on both sides. (By scale invariance, this outcome can be given equal coordinates, (a, a) in Figure 14a. ) Otherwise, the section of T through (a, a, a)-which is the point the solution has to choose for the three-agent problem T of Figure 14b -contains S ′ = S as a strict subset, and we cannot derive what we want about S. However, the desired conclusion can be obtained then by introducing more than one new agent and extending the replication. The number of new agents that are needed is all the greater, the shorter the segment centered at the Nash outcome of S in relation to a. A continuity argument is required for a problem whose boundary is strictly convex at its Nash outcome.
A very general result that involves neither symmetry nor scale invariance is given by Lensberg (1987) . He obtains a characterization of a class of solutions defined by maximizing a sum of functions of the agents' utilities having certain properties. A study of converse consistency for this model is Chun (2002) .
Coalitional games with transferable utility
The literature on consistency for coalitional games (Domain 4) is extensive, partly because on this domain, as we have already seen, the reduction operation can be defined in more than one way. We list three basic results involving one or the other of the two notions of consistency introduced in Subsubsection 3.1.3. The hypotheses of Theorems 2 and 3 include individual rationality, the requirement that at each of the payoff vectors chosen by a solution, each agent's payoff should be at least as large as his individual worth. The proofs of both theorems rely on the Bracing Lemma.
Theorem 2 (Tadenuma, 1992) On the domain of TU coalitional games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying individual rationality and complement consistency.
The next result includes the condition of super-additivity, which says that if x is chosen for some game v and y is chosen for some game w, then x + y should be chosen for the game v + w.
Theorem 3 (Peleg, 1986) On the domain of TU coalitional games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency.
Zero independence and invariance under common rescaling of utilities which appears in the next theorem is the requirement that if arbitrary constants are added to all utilities and utilities are scaled by the same positive number, the chosen payoff vector should be subjected to the same transformation. The proof of the theorem is by means of an augmentation to anonymity analogous, although considerably more complex, to that carried out in the proof of Theorem 1.
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Theorem 4 (Sobolev, 1975) The prenucleolus is the only solution satisfying single-valuedness, anonymity, zero independence and invariance under common rescaling of utilities, and max consistency.
A third notion of consistency in which the solution itself appears, is proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) , and it essentially leads to a characterization of the Shapley value.
Counterparts of Theorems 2 and 3 for the more general class of coalitional games without transferable utility are available (Tadenuma, 1992; Peleg, 1985) . Numerous other contributions have been made to the analysis of consistency for coalitional games. Examples are Maschler and Owen (1989) , Dutta (1990) , Hokari and Kıbrıs (2003) , and Hokari (2005) .
Fair division
To present the results of this section, which pertain to classical problems of fair division (Domain 1), we need two additional properties. Given a natural number k, in a k-replica of an economy, each of the preference relations is represented k times and the social endowment is multiplied by k. Replication-invariance says that if an allocation is chosen for some economy, then for each k ∈ N, and each economy obtained by replicating the economy k times, the corresponding k-replica of the allocation should be chosen.
Theorem 5 (Thomson, 1988) The proof is sketched in the legend of Figure 15a , where the replication operation is denoted with a star (k * z being obtained by replicating z k times and (k * R, kΩ) by replicating (R, Ω) k times). It involves a variant of the Elevator Lemma, in which the role of converse consistency is played by replication invariance, which is a (very) weak form of it. . Given a solution satisfying the assumptions of the theorem, suppose that there are an economy and an efficient allocation chosen for it by the solution, z, at which the values of the bundles assigned to two agents, say agents i and j, calculated at the prices supporting z (these prices exist and they are unique), are not equal. By smoothness of preferences, there is k ∈ N such that y 0 P j z i , where y 0 ≡ kz i +z j k i +1 . Then, we replicate the economy k times. Let k * z be the corresponding k-replica of z. Since z is chosen for the initial economy, then, by replication-invariance, k * z is chosen for (k * R, kΩ). Let N ′ be a subgroup of the augmented set of agents consisting of the k agents of type i and agent j. By consistency, (k * z i , z j ) is chosen for ((R ℓ ) ℓ∈N ′ , kz i + z j ). Since the solution is a subsolution of the equal-division lower bound solution, we should have z i R i y 0 , but this is in contradiction with the way we specified y 0 .
We also have the following result, in which anonymity appears: this is the requirement that the chosen allocations should be independent of the names of agents:
Theorem 6 (Thomson, 1994a) Other results for this domain are due to Maniquet (1996) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) . Roemer (1988) formulates and studies a notion of consistency where it is the number of commodities that varies.
Claims problems
To state our next result, which pertains to claims problems (Domain 7), we need the concept of a parametric solution. Consider a family of realvalued, continuous, and nowhere decreasing functions f ≡ {f (c 0 , .)} c 0 ∈R + of the parametric family can be identified (Young, 1988) , including several solutions that have played a prominent role in the public finance literature (as the model can also be seen as a cost sharing model). Another relevant contribution, in which the notion of consistency on average is developed (Section 3.1), is due to Dagan and Volij (1997) .
Allocation of indivisible goods and some amount of an infinitely divisible good
The two theorems below, which pertain to the allocation of indivisible goods and an infinitely divisible good (Domains 5 and 8), involve bracing up to neutral exchanges (operations illustrated in Figures 10 and 11 ).
Theorem 9 (Tadenuma and Thomson, 1993) If several identical objects have to be allocated, any envy-free allocation can be braced by introducing two agents, specifying their preferences in such a way that they are indifferent between the two bundles initially received by the losers and the winners (all members of each group have to receive the same bundle, by no-envy), and adding resources so that one of these new agents can be given the winners' initial bundle and the other can be given the losers' initial bundle (that is, adding one object and an amount of the divisible good equal to the sum of the amounts of the good contained initially in the losers' common bundle and the winners' common bundle).
Bevia (1996) studies consistency in situations where each agent may receive more than one object. The case of economies with only indivisible goods is treated by Ergin (2000) .
Allocation with single-peaked preferences
For fair division problems with single-peaked preferences (Domain 2), we have the following characterization:
Theorem 11 (Thomson, 1994a) There is a minimal subsolution of the noenvy and Pareto solution satisfying upper semi-continuity with respect to the social endowment and consistency. It is the uniform rule. The same conclusion holds when no-envy is replaced by the equal-division lower bound.
The proof for a solution S required to be a subsolution of the no-envy solution relies on the approximate bracing illustrated in Figure 13 . Using the notation introduced there, it concludes as follows. Let When no-envy is replaced by the equal-division lower bound solution, the conclusion is obtained as a direct consequence of the Elevator Lemma and of the fact that for the two-agent case, the no-envy solution is a subsolution of the equal-division lower bound solution.
A counterpart of Theorem 6 holds for this model, and its form is even a little simpler since the uniform rule is single-valued. A result related to Theorem 11 is due to Dagan (1996) .
Matching
For matching problems (Domain 6), we will impose both consistency and converse consistency, but note that here, for this condition to make sense, we need its hypotheses to hold for each problem involving two men and two women. The following theorem involves the Bracing Lemma.
Theorem 12 (Sasaki and Toda, 1992 ) If a subsolution of the Pareto solution satisfies anonymity, consistency, and converse consistency, then it is the stable solution.
Additional results are obtained by Toda (2006) for variants of this model, (remaining single may be an option; the reduction operation can be defined differently.) Results for the model in which the formation of each pair creates a monetary value, and the sum of the values created at a match has to be shared are developed by Sasaki (1995) and Toda (2003) .
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